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IACE RELATIONS AND A~mcAN LAw. By Jack Greenberg. Columbia
University Press, New York, 1959. 481 pp.
Race Relations and American Law, by Jack Greenberg, is an ex-
tremely interesting legal work. It treats comprehensively each of the
major issues of our time concerning White-Negro relations in the
United States, discussing in detail the state and development of the
law in each of these areas.
Moreover, it discloses Mr. Greenberg's philosophy as to the role
of the law in the field of racial relations, illustrates what the law is
capable of doing and comments upon the manner in which it should
be employed. This aspect of the book is lent considerable significance
by the fact that the author is assistant counsel for the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).'
This gives the reader the impression that the views expressed are not
merely the author's, but, in a large measure at least, those of the
NAACP and many American Negroes.
As a legal reference, Race Relations and American Law is excellent.
It covers the field in this subject, from education, public accommoda-
tions and housing, to the more settled or less publicized issues-the
armed forces and domestic relations. The coverage is ample, annota-
tions plentiful, and the material presented appears clear and accurate.
It is the legal philosophy propounded by the author with which the
reader may well find himself taking issue.
In commenting upon the desirability of a social order wherein
racial harmony has been achieved, the author states, on page 26,
"[W] e may inquire what role law can play in working toward such
an order." It would seem, especially upon considering the potential
capabilities of law which are pointed out during the course of the
book, that a more nearly proper inquiry would be what role the law
should play in such an undertaking. This thought is not pursued,
however, and is mentioned only where the implementation of the law
is designed to further some expressed aim of the Negro.
One of such expressed aims, and apparently the basic goal of
Mr. Greenberg's association, is what the author terms "affirmative
I Greenberg, "Social Scientists Take the Stand," 54 Mich. L. Rev. 953(1956).
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integration."2 Advocacy of this concept runs throughout the book, the
principle point being that the law should not only be used to eliminate
segregation, but on the contrary, should see to it that everything from
education to housing be so arranged that a complete homogenization
of the two races is achieved.3 The extremes to which it is said this
proposal should go are illustrated in the chapter on housing, where
the author complains extensively of the fact that public housing
authorities recognize color as a basis for allocation of facilities. After
asserting the unconstitutionality of such actions, he suggests on page
292 that it may be proper for such an authority to recognize race for
the purpose of affirmative integration in public housing systems. In
touching on this obviously delicate constitutional issue the author
states, "It may be contended that such an effort is unconstitutional
notwithstanding its motivation." But he argues, "The Constitution
does not require inflexible formalisms, it looks to the substance of the
issue." While it may well be that in recent years the Constitution
has been severely stretched, 4 such a theory as this one advanced by
Mr. Greenberg would produce a ridiculously paradoxical result. While
on the one hand a government agency would be prohibited by the
Constitution from considering race in allocating its facilities, it would,
on the other, be constitutionally permitted to do just that, thus placing
the Constitution in direct opposition to itself on the issue. There would
seem to be little question that such activity is equally as unconstitu-
tional as segregation itself.5
The question arises at this point, as to whether the author and
those whose philosophy he propounds wish to attain equal protection
of the law for all men, or whether, instead, they wish to go beyond
this by twisting the law into a tool with which to enforce their own
sociological theories and experiments.
Closely allied to "affirmative integration" is the subject of so-called
"de facto segregation." The author explains on page 249 that the
"de facto" problem occurs primarily where there are large Negro
areas which produce all Negro or "de facto segregated" schools.
The problem, he asserts, is aggravated by unfair or unreasonable
zoning laws. It is probable that if a school zone were to wind like a
2 Statement of Robert C. Weaver before the 50th anniversary convention of
the NAACP, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1959, p. 13, col. 1.
3 Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law, pp. 25, 253, 256, 257, 273,
275, 291, 292, and 311 (1959).
4 See James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1959), affd, 267 F.
2d 224 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 361 U.S. 835 (1959). See also Blaustein and
Ferguson, Desegregation and the Law, (1957), 58 Colum. L. Rev. 428 (1958).5 Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
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thread throughout a city in order to encompass its colored population,
segregation would be said to exist." But the author attacks even such
cities as New York where this is obviously not the case.7 Again
affirmative integration, this time by local governments, is urged as a
panacea to the situation.
As mentioned before, many of the fundamental rights which are
basic to the American way of life appear to be overlooked in the
argument for the theory of "affirmative integration." Nowhere is this
fact more noticeable than in Mr. Greenberg's section on real property
and housing. Throughout this entire section is found the theme that
the law should strive, as far as possible, to force the integration of
housing facilities, both public and private. It is at this point that the
reader is given a clear insight into the real meaning of "affirmative
integration." It becomes obvious that what is really meant is "forced
integration;" in other words, government compulsion of individuals
of different races to live in close proximity with one another, regardless
of their personal desires in the matter. Practically every conceivable
theory of government and legal action is proposed in order to accom-
plish this scheme. On page 293, Mr. Greenberg sets forth the idea
of deliberately locating public housing projects in such strategic
locations that needy persons of both races living near the area will be
forced to move into this project if they wish to remain in their
neighborhood. 8 Again, on page 292, the possibility is explored of a
quota system which includes the refusal of certain accommodations
to needy Negro families in largely Negro apartment houses or neigh-
borhoods, solely in order to leave room into which white persons may
move." Finally, on pages 308 and 309, the author exhuberantly
enumerates a host of new laws which, in effect, prohibit the property
owner from exercising his free choice in selecting vendees or lessees
for his property, and in some cases permit the state to make this
choice for him.'0 As desirable as integration may be to many, it is
obvious that those who do not share these feelings have fundamental
rights, among these being freedom of choice" and freedom to use and
6 Jones v. School Board, 278 F. 2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960).
7 N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1960, p. 1, col. 6.
8 See also Greenberg, supra note 3 at 312.
9 The New York City Housing Authority has already taken this step. New
York Times, Feb. 28, 1958, p. R. 1, col. 8, R. 2, col. 2; Nov. 19, 1959, p. 24, col
5; July 24, 1959, p. 26, col. 2; Aug. 29, 1960, p. 89, col. 1.
'0 Avins, "Anti-Discrimination Legislation as an Infringement on Freedom of
Choice," 6 N.Y.L.F. 13 (1960).
"Ibid. Cf. New York State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham
Hall Apartments, Inc., 10 Misc. 346, 171 N.Y.S. 2d 558 (1958), noted by Mr.
Greenberg at p. 307, n. 129.
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dispose of private property.' 2 One can scarcely fail to see flagrant
disregard of these rights in promoting the cause of "forced integra-
tion." Several searching questions may well be raised at this point.
First, since state action forcing the races to live apart has been held
unconstitutional, why then is it permissible for such state action to
force them to live together? It is set forth that all persons shall
receive the equal protection of the laws, regardless of race, creed, or
color.13 In other words, as is pointed out by the author on page 292,
"Our Constitution is color blind."' 4 How can it be said that equal
protection of the laws is truly being afforded if on the one hand a state
is prohibited from enforcing the biased views of one racial philosophy
and, on the other hand, it is permitted to enforce the equally biased
concepts of another? Would it not be more in accord with the spirit
and intent of the Constitution if state action, both segregation and
"affirmative integration," were prohibited altogether in the field of
race relations, leaving the task of achieving racial unity to education,
religion, and the morals and consciences of men, and thus refraining
from interference with any of those aforementioned rights so important
to all Americans? 15 Objective answers to these questions should lead
the reader to the conclusion that forced integration is forbidden by the
same laws and decisions that condemn segregation.'0 Little mention,
however, is made in this book of such questions as these. The author
reluctantly admitted, on page 292, that such schemes of "affirmative
integration" had not been put to a judicial test.17
In view, apparently, of the substantial doubt as to judicial
cooperation in such a program, a point is made advocating administra-
tive implementation of this purpose. The author states on page 16,
in regard to the administrative method, "An administrative agency,
or an attorney general or other official with comparable powers, can
be more effective than private suitors or criminal prosecutors.... An
administrative approach offers opportunity to employ the law in
unusual ways." That this is indeed true is illustrated on page 291
12 Witherwax, "Anti-Discrimination Legislation as it Affects Real Property
Bights," 23 Albany L. Rev. 75 (1959). See also O'meara v. Washington State
Bd. Against Discrimination, (Superior Court Kings County, Washington, No.
535, 996, July 31, 1959), 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 682 (1959).
'3 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
14 Harlen, J., dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
15 Avins, supra note 10 at 25; Witherwax, supra note 12; cf. Greenberg, Race
Relations and American Law, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 598 (1959).
16 See Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), City of Montgomery
v. Gilmore, 277 F. 2d 364, 369, n.5 (5th Cir. 1960); note, 'Racial Discrimination
in Housing," 107 Pa. L. Rev. 515, 540-550 (1959); Navasky, "The Benevolent
Housing Quota," 6 How. L.J. 30 (1960).
17 But see Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell, .supra note 5, where they were
found to be unconstitutional.
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where one finds set forth the attempt of the chairman of the New York
State Commissions Against Discrimination to encourage integration
through action; i.e. enforcing the quota system in public housing,
The desirability of administrative action to further the ends of the
integrationists is urged in every section of the book. There are
numerous examples of how administrative agencies can, and are,
forcing integration by, as the author has noted, "employing the law in
unusual ways."' 9 These ways are, it is implied, always desirable and
often necessary if integration is to be accomplished. This unquestion-
ably is the law in its strongest and most effective form.20 It is obvious
why any group, integrationists included, should seek to have this form
of law employed to further its own ends.
The only question remaining is the one originally asked, namely,
should the law be utilized in this manner? In his consideration of this
question, the reader can scarcely overlook a point which is made in
the conclusion of the last section, "The Armed Forces." In this section
it is shown that in the Armed Services almost complete integration has
been achieved by virtue of the fact that absolute governmental control
exists therein. In his conclusion, on page 369, the author points out,
"Integration of the armed forces shows the potential of law for
achieving changes in race relations. In a democracy no one is subject
to greater legal control than those in the Armed Services, and no other
aspect of American life is so subject to governmental management, no
other control can be so swift and unequivocal."
Upon being faced here with the stark realization of the magnitude
of the law's potential, the objective reader, regardless of his views on
integration, can scarcely help but wonder about the advisability of
increased administrative control over the personal lives of private
individuals.
In conclusion, Race Relations and American Law is an excellent
legal reference in this field, as well as a documentation of the
philosophy, methods, and aspirations of the NAACP and similar Negro
organizations. It is particularly thought provoking in regard to its
legal philosophy and herein, I believe, lies this work's main interest.
It can be recommended to anyone who is interested in attaining a
more thorough understanding of the subject.
Charles H. Witherwax
18 Supra note 9.
19 Greenberg supra note 3, at pp. 20, 114, 192, 202, 203, 205, 248, 273, 291,
292.
20 Id. at pp. 20, 192, 248.
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